Crime specific event patterns are crucial in detecting potential relationships among suspects in criminal networks. However, current link analysis tools commonly used in detection do not utilize such patterns for detecting various types of crimes. These analysis tools usually provide generic functions for all types of crimes and heavily rely on the user's expertise on the domain knowledge of the crime for successful detection. As a result, they are less effective in detecting patterns in certain crimes. In addition, substantial effort is also required for analyzing vast amount of crime data and visualizing the structural views of the entire criminal network. In order to alleviate these problems, an event-based approach to money laundering data analysis and visualization is proposed in this paper. The effectiveness of the proposed method is demonstrated on a money laundering case from Taiwan.
INTRODUCTION
In criminal networks, offenders play different roles for various illegal activities [19] . These offenders are usually connected via various relationships such as co-workers, friends, business partner and kinship [12] . Criminal networks usually involve in organized crimes such as armed robbery, drug trafficking and money laundering, etc. Link analysis tools [11] are often used in investigation to uncover the information among criminals or criminal networks. Link analysis [28] may uncover the offenders who belong to the same supply chain in illicit drug supply networks. The main function of link analysis is to retrieve information from raw data which is related to entities such as bank accounts, telephone records, and criminal reports. The data is then processed and presented in a structured format. Link analysis further analyzes the information and identifies the relationship between the entities.
In recent years, a number of researches on link analysis systems have been undertaken. These system includes NETMAP [21] , Analyst's Notebook [1] , COPLINK [7] [13] [14] , etc. Most of these systems are originated from academic researches. Some of them have been extended into commercial products and are being used by various investigation departments. Majority of these systems use proprietary data formats for analysis.
Link analysis can be time-consuming and requires substantial amount of manual work. This includes ad-hoc tasks such as searching heterogeneous databases, analyzing reports on crime, and reviewing clues from criminal networks. Although some commercial software are labeled as link analysis tools, these software only provide functions for visualizing manually constructed criminal networks. In these systems, associations between entities are often required to be input by the user manually.
In addition, association analysis still encounters many challenging issues. For instance, it is extremely time consuming in analyzing vast amount of available crime data and visualizing structural views of the entire criminal network. As a result, these tools are less effective in detecting patterns in certain crimes. In order to alleviate these problems, an event-based approach to criminal data analysis and visualization is proposed in this paper. The proposed approach specifically targets in detecting money laundering cases.
The overall system utilizes a structured event-based database to store crime related records. The system also includes modules for detection of clusters, modules for calculation of degree of suspicion and degree of association, and a module for criminal networks visualization. A prototype system based on the proposed techniques is being designed and implemented in Microsoft Visual Studio [23] .
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we review related work on link analysis, visualization tools, and event-based techniques. In Section 3, different corruption and money laundering methods and trends are introduced. In Section 4, we briefly describe the overall system design. In Section 5, a brief introduction on heuristics for detecting money laundering is discussed. In section 6, algorithms for proposed crime detection system is detailed. In Section 7, a case study on a money laundering case from Taiwan is given. In Section 8, we conclude the paper with future work.
BACKGROUD AND RELATED WORK
In criminal investigation, association analysis tools are often used to identify/search the links connecting various entities from the dataset of large criminal networks.
Link Analysis and Visualization
NetMap Analytics [21] is used by intelligence agencies around the world for analyzing millions of items of data to detect fraudulent activities. NetMap uses the techniques that process across a whole spectrum of criminal cases to identify the murderers, drug rings, insurance fraud rings, terrorists, and the supporters. NetMap can link thousands of pieces of data and reveal invisible connections among entities.
At present, NetMap assists the government investigators from Australia, UK, USA and Europe to cull useful information from the large volumes of data for analyzing the criminal behavior. Two successful cases of such applications in Australia are the "Backpacker Murders" and the "Mystery TNT Options Trader" [21] .
Analyst's Notebook [1] is an analysis and visualization tool for analyzing criminal data and fraudulent activities. The investigators can use Analyst's Notebook to identify connections, patterns and trends between criminal networks. The Analyst's Notebook can be combined with other compatible products via the i2 operation platform to acquire data from disparate data sources. It also allows users to search, match and analyze data from the various products. For instance, Analyst's Notebook users can generate a chart by dragging and dropping entities into the forms.
COPLINK [7] integrates multiple data sources from local, regional, and national police departments for detecting the association among the crime entities. The COPLINK prototype has been designed with knowledge management technology to consolidate, share, and identify relationships from criminal records. NetMap Analytics, Analyst's Notebook, and COPLINK [13] are all designed with the functions for visualizing the association among entities. A common goal of these systems is to analyze and discover hidden relationships and interconnections from seemingly unrelated data.
Event-based Database
In this section, we review existing event-based systems based on a number of criteria. An event is defined as a significant occurrence to present activities at a single point in space-time [15] . These events usually involve components such as occurred time and location related to the activities. Event-based database stores records involving various parameters and dimensions of events. The event time and location are the primary attributes [16] when representing a criminal case. A spatio-temporal database [4] is a system which primarily handles both space and time information [26] . These databases are also used in processing information such as crime records [27] , patients' history, and records of traffic accidents etc. Table 1 shows a summary on event-based techniques from [6] . Space-related
The event dimensions are associated with region and position information.
ReCAP [2] CrimeStat [17] COPLINK [3] Snap [10] Content-related
The event dimensions are associated with reports, document details, and case description event details.
CrimeStat [17] COPLINK [3] Snap [10] Person-related
The event dimensions are associated with personal information such as occupation, name, date of birth, address, nationality, contact information, etc.
COPLINK [3] 
MONEY LAUNDERING METHODS AND TRENDS
Money laundering is the process of creating an appearance that large amounts of money obtained from illegitimate business originated from a legitimate source. Money laundering cases usually involve directing or collecting large amount of money coming to/from unknown origins. In such cases, a number of bank accounts may also be setup for temporary use by the offenders. The main purpose is to make the money -clean‖ or to hide the ambiguous source of funds. The process may involve concealing large amounts of money acquired from serious crimes, such as trafficking firearms, drugs, high-interest loan, smuggling, prostitution, fraud, corruption, tax evasion, extortion, kidnapping and robbery, etc. In money laundering cases, offenders usually tend to avoid traditional payment systems such as credit cards and checks to conceal financial transactions. Although cash payments are widely used in money laundering cases, it is hard to deal with huge amount of cash since it is bulky and difficult to be transferred.
In summary, money laundering can be also considered as a process of concealing illegal money transactions. Money laundering includes three money laundering stages namely placement, layering and integration [9] .
Placement Stage
Placement is the first stage in the money laundering cycle [9] [18] [20] . In this stage, the suspects may attempt to avoid detection of illegal benefits by transforming physical currency into other assets. For instance, huge amount of (physical) money from the illegal activities is laundered through the financial system via business activities such as cash smuggling, investing in real estates, buying valuable items, currency trading, buying of securities and futures, depositing into bank accounts or mixing with the legal money, remittance, and retailing.
Layering Stage
In the layering stage, the suspect will carry out a series of activities in an attempt to obscure the trail of the illicit source of the funds [9] [18] [20] . The launderer may establish complex financial transaction layers between the funds in order to conceal the audit trail and the ownership of the funds. The layer generally consists of bank-to-bank, bank-to-remittance agent, money changer-to-bank, etc. It may also involve transferring of funds to offshore bank accounts related to shell companies in tax haven countries, resale of goods/assets, and frequent deposits/transfers/transections.
Integration Stage
The final stage in the laundering cycle is to gather (aggregate) the illicit funds from various legitimate commercial activities and financial systems. These activities involve selling of property assets, valuable goods, and financial instruments [9] [18] [20] . The dispersed illicit funds appear as legal assets after the integration process.
An example money laundering scenario between three users (A, B, and C) is shown in Figure 1 . In this process, user A attempts to confuse, hide and interrupt the tracking of funds by passing through different channels. The illicit funds could be transferred via a remittance agent in order to avoid the scrutiny by law enforcement or bank regulatory authorities. The funds may also be divided into numerous amounts which are lower than the threshold of government reporting requirement. The money launderer may also perform a number of deposits or withdrawals in small amount to avoid detection by the authorities. 
SYSTEM DESIGN
The design of the proposed crime analysis system is depicted in Figure 2 . The system consists of four components which include Event-Based Database for Criminal Records, Data Preprocessing for Criminal Detection, Clusters and Association Detection, and Visualization. The proposed system can be partly mapped to the notional model of sensemaking loop for intelligence analysis [25] . 
Figure 2. System design
In our system, crime related information is stored in the criminal record database. The database contains basic information such as time, locations, persons, and crime activities. In addition, a knowledge base is used to store domain specific heuristics for identifying links. The cluster and association detection module in Figure 2 is responsible for finding criminal networks and the degree of association between two or more criminals. The uncovered clusters and associations are then displayed in visualization module.
Event-based Data Analysis
We use an event-based database model [7] to store the records about criminal relationship network analysis. In this model, crime entities are represented as objects. Each object includes information such as time, locations, persons and activities. In addition, associations are defined as links between two or more objects. An example of event-based method to represent activities within a specified period is shown in Figure 3 .
Time is a critical factor in detecting criminal cases. Investigators usually specify the start and end date of the detection period to filter some important clues. For instance, in some corruption cases, the suspect used to have certain decision making privileges in an organization during a specific period. For this type of cases, the investigator will be interested in collecting the related information about the suspect such as activities of his/her colleagues and family members during that period in which the suspect has special privileges. Such investigation can be found in the corruption case of former Taiwanese's President, Mr. Chen. He was involved in money laundering during his time as the president of Taiwan.
In the prototype system, an event-based model is designed to record all the activities of the criminal entities together with the respective time attributes. For instance, as shown in Figure 3 , the system stores an event regarding establishing of a company at the time of 2007/12/10 by a person called Dick. The -Officer‖ attribute records the origin of the information. For example, it records whether the information is provided by a witness, or an informant, or by a law enforcement officer. The attribute -RPT 012/09‖ provides a reference to identify the information elsewhere in a database, or a filename. Attribute -L1‖ (level 1) is used to reflect the reliability of the information. 
Data Preprocessing for Criminal Detection
Money laundering is one of the most reported crimes in recent years and usually connected with smuggling and corruption cases. Although money laundering occurs in various parts of the world, it has some common characteristics. These characteristics become recognizable signatures in detecting money laundering cases. In the proposed model, data preprocessing for criminal detection module employs a knowledge base for storing crime specific heuristics. These heuristics are described in the Section 5.
If necessary, the proposed system could be extended to interface with other data sources. For instance, the system may need to acquire additional data from disparate data sources such as police, customs and transport departments. In our system, a ranking database is also designed to store temporary search result obtained from the application of crime specific rules. The ranking is used to assist in data preprocessing to filter the unrelated information.
HEURISTICS FOR DETECTING MONEY LAUNDERING
For identifying associations, we have used some of the investigation methods proposed in [5] . Attributes considered for detecting criminal associations in money laundering cases are identified as follows:
Corruption Network: In general, a suspect may use a network of trusted people such as family members, colleagues or friends for laundering money. The suspect could be in charge of the treasury/accounting department or related to other staff in those types of department or holds important positions in government or public organizations or may have business connections or financial activities with other suspects.
Crime period: Offenses often take place when the suspect is appointed as a key officer.
Bank Transactions: Money laundering may involve frequent deposits or withdrawals of large cash transactions. Bank accounts may only be opened for a short period for deposit of money. In some countries, any remittance above a predefined level needs to be reported to the authorities. In some money laundering cases, instead of using large transactions, lower value transactions are often used to avoid detection. For instance, the Black Market Peso Exchange [33] uses structured transactions method to hamper any investigations. "U-turn" transactions are also used in money laundering cases. For instance, money from a person or a company will be transferred to another person or company, and then re-transferred the money back to the original owner or the company.
Suspicious entities: Suspects may launder unlawful money via shell companies, secretarial companies, company formation agents, simulation of international loans, capitalization of legitimate companies with illegal funds [8] in "Tax haven", and "Off-shore financial centers" which act as the authorized signatory of the bank account. The launderer usually establishes these anonymous companies to disguise the true ownership of the unlawful funds.
Suspicious regions: Events related to countries and regions which are not in compliance with anti-money laundering Financial Action Task Force (FATF) [8] Recommendations should be scrutinized.
Suspect's career: Low income occupations such as driver, hawker, waiter and student should not involve high value transactions.
Suspect's age: Young or elderly people should not involve high value transactions.
Suspect's salary: Based on the records of suspect's salary, possible amount of any remittance or deposit related to the related bank accounts can be estimated.
Transaction behavior:
The average balance, the total number of transactions, and types of transactions of an account over a period of time can give an indication of the financial activities of the suspect. These activities could be either classified as normal or suspicious. Increase in any activities should be carefully examined by the investigators.
DETECTION ALGORITHMS
In this section, we describe the algorithms for calculating the degree of suspicion of a person and degree of association between two entities.
Algorithms for Calculating the Degree of Suspicion
All entities (including the suspect) are assigned with a degree to denote the level of suspicion (or possibility of committing the offense). In addition to the degree of suspicion for each member, we also define the degree of association for every link among entities within a cluster. This degree is used to represent the closeness between two entities. In this algorithm, if two persons share the same property (such as car, house, stock shares), or if they are found to be part of certain financial transactions, the degree of association of the link between them is increased. The algorithms for calculating the degree of suspicion of a person and degree of association between two entities are summarized in Table 2 . Identifies the family members of the suspect during a given period. Algo. 2 Identifies the colleagues of the suspect during a given period. Algo. 3 Calculates the degree of suspicion of the suspect and its colleagues within the cluster based on the type/nature of occupations.
Algo. 4
Calculates the degree of suspicion of the suspect and its colleagues/family members within the cluster. In this algorithm, bank transactions between the suspect and its colleagues/family members are used for calculation. Algo. 5 Calculates the degree of suspicion of all members within the cluster based on the members' bank activities. Algo. 6 Calculates the degree of suspicion of all members within the cluster based on the existence of shell companies. Algo. 7 Calculates the degree of association between two entities.
Algorithm for Calculating the Degree of Association
To calculate the degree of suspicion and degree of association, we define a scoring scheme as shown in Table 3 . Whenever the corresponding condition is true, the degree of suspicion or association will be increased by the point defined in the table. For instance, in row 2 of degree of suspicion calculation, if the suspect is the head of the finance related department, the degree of suspicion will be increased by 1 point by the Algorithm 3. Note that the points defined in Table 3 can be different depending on the preference of the investigator or the nature of the crime. 
Iterative Crime Detection and Link Identification
For each family and colleague member in cluster, all seven algorithms described above can be used iteratively to discover further suspects and new clusters. For instance, after applying algorithm 1 and 2, we can identify the family and colleague clusters associated with the suspect. In our prototype, yellow circles are used to indicate colleagues and green circles are used to indicate family members.
Next, algorithms 3, 4, 5 and 6 are used to calculate the degree of suspicion of each member in the cluster. If a suspect's degree of the suspicion is greater than a predefined threshold value, the node representing the suspect will be represented by a blue circle. The iterative detection can be preformed for the cluster members who have high degree of suspicion.
The final step in detection is the identification of strongest association among suspects. The algorithm 7 can be repeatedly used to find the association from a single source node to all the other nodes in a connected graph. If the degree of association is greater than a predefined threshold value, the link will be highlighted to represent a possible criminal connection. 
Main algorithm

Visualization
Finally, the entities in the criminal network and all detected associations are visualized in graphical forms. In these graphs, each entity is assigned with a unique identity and different node colors are used for classification. The conceptualization of visualization process is depicted in Figure 4 . At the current stage of the prototype implementation, we use Pajek [22] 
MING
Step 1:
Indentify family member cluster
Step 2:
Indentify colleague cluster
Step 3:
Indentify sub cluster and calculate the degree of suspicion and association The investigation was initiated when Taiwanese prosecutor's office received some complaints about WU stealing purchase receipts for claiming from the Secret Presidential Fund. The fund is originally designated for handling diplomatic work overseas. According to the Taiwan's laws and regulations, a receipt should be provided to claim the related expense [29] . In the indictment from the Taiwan Taipei District Prosecutors Office, it was stated that WU, MA, LIN, and HUI are accountable by the corruption act and have been prosecuted based on the investigation result and evidence collected.
In this case study, we apply the algorithms from section 6 to the suspect and all related parties. Figure 5 shows the investigation procedure to identify the clusters.

In step 1, algorithm 1 is used to identify the family cluster of Mr. Chen.  In step 2, algorithm 2 is used to identify the colleague cluster of Mr. Chen.  In step 3, algorithms 3, 4, 5, and 6 are used to calculate the degree of suspicion of each member in the family and colleague clusters. For each member in the sub cluster group, the algorithm 7 is used to calculate the degree of association. Both degrees are calculated iteratively for all members in the identified clusters. Finally, by comparing both degrees with respective threshold values, suspicious targets and links from the clusters are identified and they are visualized as connected graphs.
Detecting Family Clusters
Family members, and closely related colleagues or friends are usually used as trusted persons to handle illegal funds during money laundering. Algorithm 1 is used to identify family members during the event period (2000/5-2008/5) from the family event records. For instance, in Table 4 , a -marriage‖ event is used to link WU and Mr. Chen in 1975. In the algorithm 1, if the suspect is detected as the family members, the degree of suspicion will be increased by 1 point.
The algorithm discovers WU, CHUNG, YU, CHING, and MING as the family members of the suspect. The corresponding degree of suspicion for each member is shown in Table 5 . The family cluster is shown as a connected graph in Figure 6 . Figure 6 . Family cluster
Detecting Colleague Clusters
The former President Mr. Chen exercised his powers in accordance with the Constitution [24] and established the Office of the President (see 
Iterative Detection
In the previous section, algorithm 1 and algorithm 2 are used to identify the family and colleague clusters of the suspect Mr. Chen. In order to narrow down the investigation scope, algorithm 3, 4, 5 and 6 are used to calculate the degree of suspicion for each member in the family and colleague cluster. Algorithm 3 is used to identify all colleagues who have ever been employed at the financial department and suspicious department (i.e. Security Affairs department). Specifically, the algorithm identifies the colleagues of the suspect who have ever worked at the Security Affairs department during the investigation period. In Figure 8 , algorithm 3 has identified department heads A, B, C. The algorithm also identifies MA and LIN who are in charge of Security Affairs department. Please note that we have replaced the names of some of the suspects with anonymous letters to protect their identities. The resulted family and colleague clusters are shown in Figure 9 . Since MA and LIN, are found to be in charge of these selected departments, the degree of suspicion of these suspects is also increased. Based on Algorithm 3, the degree of suspicion for each person in Table 6 can be calculated. The algorithm calculates the degree of suspicion based on the predefined score points from Table 3 . The resulted degree of suspicion for all suspects is shown in the Table 7 . Next, Algorithm 4 and 5 are used to detect bank transactions between the suspect and its colleagues/family members. The finance related events extracted from [31] [32] are depicted in Table 8 . The degree of suspicion for WU is increased to 4 since two transactions are detected in Table 8 . In a similar way, the degree of suspicion for CHUNG and CHING can be calculated.
The updated degree of suspicion is shown in the Table 9 . The main algorithm proceeds with the iterative detection for the suspects who have high degree of suspicion such as WU as shown in the Table 9 .
In Figure 10 , members who have high degree of suspicion (greater than 2) are displayed in blue circles. The iterative detection continues to identify the family cluster of WU which includes YING and MAO (WU's brother). Through algorithm 4, the degree of suspicion is again increased for YING and MAO.
According to the records from Table 10 , there were some transactions between MAO and CHING. According to records, money from MAO's bank account in Singapore was transferred to CHING's bank account in Switzerland. Finally, MAO was indicted [32] by The Public Prosecutor's Office of the Taiwan High Court and charged for assisting in money laundering as shown in Figure 11 . 
Degree of Association
After the clusters have been identified, the algorithm 7 is used to determine the degree of association between two or more suspects. The algorithm applies scores defined in Table 3 for calculating the degree of association. The result of the calculation is shown in Table 11 .
For instance, in row 1, last column of Table 11 , degree of association between Mr. Chen and WU (denoted by link 2-1) is equal to 4 since (a) they are part of the suspect's family, and (b) bank transactions between them have also been detected by the investigators. Each condition results in score of 2 points and therefore the total degree of association is equal to 4. Degree of association for other suspects can be calculated in a similar way. The corresponding graph for Table 11 is depicted in Figure 12 .
Links with high degree of association are represented in red color. 
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose an event-based approach to criminal data analysis and visualization. The overall system utilizes a structured event-based database to store criminal records. In this system, several algorithms are developed for identification of clusters (family and colleagues) and calculation of suspicious degree and association degree. The result of the calculation is then visualized as connected graphs. The effectiveness of the proposed method is demonstrated on a money laundering case from Taiwan.
The main contributions of our research work are two-fold; from the theoretical standpoint, we contribute to the analysis, design, and development of an event-based approach for money laundering data analysis and visualization. The proposed algorithms can (a) iteratively identify clusters, (b) calculate degree of suspicion and association based on the event records, and (c) visualize the analysis outcomes. Such automated processes presented in this paper can be extremely helpful for investigators since tedious manual network construction process is no longer required. From the practical standpoint, our research opens the door to the further development of mechanisms for detecting different types of crime. For instance, the heuristics described in section 5 can be extended for crimes such as drug trafficking and homicide.
As for the future work, we are extending the visualization module. We are also planning to extend the knowledge base for detecting other crimes.
